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Minister President Koch, Mr. Tietmeyer, Mr. Methfessel, Ladies and 
Gentlemen. 
 
The powerful downswing in economic activity in the past two years is not the 
only disturbing downswing experienced in the western world after the 1930s.  
 
The depression that developed in the U.S. and Western Europe over the 
late 1970s and early 1980s was also very powerful. The unemployment rate 
reached 10% in the US and 12% in Europe. It was also very disturbing: it 
provoked serious social unrest in the U.S. We did not understand well at the 
time what the cause was. It turned out the explanation was mainly a 
slowdown in “technical progress,” thus in productivity growth. Fortunately, 
productivity growth revived to a degree around 1990 and the period 1996 to 
2006 was one of pretty fast productivity growth. 
 
This time the origins of the downswing are known – details aside – and 
there is no social unrest. Yet we have had little experience with downswings 
resulting from asset price collapse leading to near-insolvency and financial 
crisis. 
 
For that reason, it has taken considerable thought to understand the 
reasons this present downswing not only caused an end to he housing boom 
but also the beginning of a slump, or depression. 
 
One classical mechanism was obvious: When speculators abandoned 
their expectations that housing prices were headed for a new and higher 
plateau, classical theory implied that housing process would immediately 
drop like a stone – though not to a level so low as to be below the old plateau. 
(The classical two-sector explanation can safely be omitted.) On this account, 
employment would drop too – though not to a level at or below the “natural” 
level, which I suppose was roughly the level prevailing before the boom. 
(With house construction below the level required to replace the housing 
stock as units were retired, the stock of housing would then be on a further, 
slowly descending course to its normal level. Hence rentals would be rising 
relative to house prices, so housing output and employment would also be 
subsiding back to its normal level.) 
 
Another classical mechanism was wealth. With the bulge of the housing 
stock brought by the housing boom, real wealth, measured in units of 
standard housing, was still elevated. This must have sapped older workers’ 
drive to go on earning. (All those houses to enjoy and look after!) So, even 
from a classical standpoint, employment might decline to a level below the 
old normal level from which the economy started when the boom began. (My 
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analysis had reached this point when I spoke at the Milan Stock Exchange in 
spring 2008 and the BIS conference in summer 2008.) 
 
To explain how the unemployment could rise to a level as large as 10% 
we needed something more. One reason was the insolvency problems at the 
banks, which led to a massive credit crunch. Banks were forced to call in 
loans or to continue lending only to bad borrowers in which a bank had a 
stake. 
 
Another reason was the increased uncertainty premium resulting from 
ignorance of how far the downswing would go and thus what the prospects 
were for asset results and loan repayments in the future. Thus a collapse of 
share prices will tend to follow the collapse of housing prices. (At the Banco 
Central in Buenos Aires in September 2008 I showed the theoretically 
contractionary effect of this premium.) 
 
Now the question is, what are the mechanisms of the upswing? Why 
should employment, after going down, turn around and go up? Why should 
we expect an upturn?  
 
The usual answer is that inventory investment will have to turn around 
once inventories have fallen sufficiently far. But we don’t really know 
whether output will rise to equal spending once again or whether spending 
will fall to equal output! 
 
Another answer is that, empirically, markets tend to overshoot. Having 
done so again, they will now pull output and employment right back up. But 
how big is this overshoot? Maybe it is not big enough to hang your hat on! 
 
A powerful answer is that once employment and output level off, the 
uncertainty will lift. That in turn will send share prices up, which had been so 
hard hit by the increased uncertainty during the downswing. Also, the credit 
crunch will let up once the number of non-performing loans stops increasing. 
(Banks have not been lending much during the downswing since they have 
been having doubts about the ability to repay.) 
 
Another, familiar answer is that, as long as investment activity is not 
enough to cover the retirement of the capital stock because of age and 
obsolescence, the useful capital stock is shrinking. As the stock shrinks, 
producers continue to feel encouraged that they could sell an unchanged 
amount of output sooner than before; so they continue to step up their 
production – until production is big enough to cover replacement needs. (The 
trouble with that argument is that it is hard to build a model in which 
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shrinking capital raises prices of capital goods rather than prices of the 
consumer goods that capital is used to make.) 
 
I would not say that a weaker dollar (or euro) is a solution – a recipe for 
return to high employment. We have a weaker dollar, of course. The problem 
is that this weakness, will terrific for exporters, such as manufacturers of 
tradable products, tends to lower the relative price of non-tradable goods, 
which are relatively labor-intensive. So recovery through this mechanism 
will tend to produce a recovery of output with little accompanying recovery 
of jobs. 
 
However, all of this has a mechanical tone. It is a mistake, I believe, to 
think that the level of investment, on which (in my view) the level of 
employment depends, is driven almost exclusively by the capital 
requirements of current production. The economy will be on a sort of war 
footing – in which only current consumption needs are addressed – as long as 
companies do not want to employ people for future projects. Getting from, 
say, 7.5% back to 5.5% will require a return of the old prosperity to innovate. 
Really high employment will require really high investment and the latter 
will require dynamism – a high propensity to invest in general, not just when 
the sun is shining. 
 
The organizers asked me to discuss the outlook. I’ve just discussed the 
“bounce” back to, say, 7.5%. Will the US economy have the dynamism to get 
to 5.5%, as in the mid-1990s, let alone the lower level enjoyed in the good 
internet boom and the bad housing boom? I have observed several 
disquieting signs of reduced dynamism. 
 
One bad sign is that investors have withdrawn their funds from the 
venture capital firms in Silicon Valley. It is said that they became 
disillusioned by a decade of very poor earnings on their investment. The 
venture capitalists explain that there few if any good entrepreneurial projects 
in sight – with the possible exception of new developments in solar energy. 
But in such a vast economy, how could it be that there were no good projects 
out there? Maybe the VCs make excessive demands on the start-ups – in 
interest charges, for example. 
 
In his recent book, Financial Darwinism, Leo Tilman, a colleague at the 
Center on Capitalism and Society, argues that the banking industry has been 
over-crowded in the past decade and must therefore shrink. Presumably the 
contraction of credit that will produce will be offset by the emergence of new 
financial companies, such as hedge funds. (In America we love them. The 
British do too. Keynes ran a hedge fund in London in the early 1930s. There 
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were hedge funds in Scotland in the 18th Century.) My main proposition in 
this context is that the outlook will continue to be poor until the existing 
banks do shrink and make room for new banks. In an essay to appear in 
Harvard Business Review in January 2010, Leo Tilman and I advocate that 
the federal government create a system of “merchant” banks that would lend 
to and invest in businesses for investment projects of an innovative character 
– including large-scale long-term projects. (Hedge funds are naturally too 
small for this purpose.) 
 
Another deficiency in the system is the terrible short-termism in the 
business sector. There is a fixation on earnings in the next quarter. We have 
all been so caught up the housing boom, the commercial real estate boom, the 
explosion of exotic new financial products as banks struggle to avoid 
Darwinian extinction, etc. that we have not noticed the possibility that that 
the business sector and the financial sector are both no good anymore. 
 
To sum up, the outlook in the US is not bright. We can be hopeful for 
the very long run, after a fundamental refounding of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. 
But in the medium term future and for somewhat longer than that, I do not 
now expect good economic performance. And if a bad political reaction sets 
in as a result, the situation could go from bad to worse. 
